The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s annual summit recently wrapped up in Tianjin, China — culminating in a military parade through Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. While the event offered several world leaders the chance to perform on a global stage, Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to showcase his efforts at “overcoming Russia’s international isolation.” However, judging by the actual outcomes, there were no radical shifts in relations between any of the key attendees — China, India, and Russia. Although they remain unwilling to openly endorse Moscow’s war in Ukraine, neither Beijing nor New Delhi are willing to put the necessary pressure on Putin to end the bloodshed.
Between Aug. 31 and Sept. 1, China hosted two major events: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin and a grand parade in Beijing, the latter marking the 80th anniversary of the country’s victory over Japan in World War II. Xi Jinping sent out invitations across the so-called “axis of upheaval,” and at the event, both Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un could be seen by the Chinese leader’s side on the podium. Reportedly, even Donald Trump was invited (but did not attend).
Xi’s attempt to showcase his influence is evident from the guest list. In addition to Putin and Kim, the parade also attracted leaders from Central, South, and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the Global South, which China increasingly seeks to frame as a counterweight to the so-called collective West. From Western countries, only a pair of heads of state traveled to China — Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić. On the U.S. side, even Ambassador David Perdue elected to skip the parade, apparently reflecting the Trump administration’s effort to put some distance between itself and Xi and Putin.
China is increasingly seeking to position the Global South as a counterweight to the so-called collective West
Ahead of the summit, Xi delivered a speech on the new “post-American-led international order” and pledged to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” — a stock phrase for SCO summits that in practice means little. Russian propaganda, meanwhile, rushed to forecast grand geopolitical triumphs from Putin’s trip. Presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov described the visit as “unprecedented,” stressing that the full potential for Russia–China relations is “still untapped.” Pro-Kremlin newspapers, for their part, warned of “global upheavals.” The Chinese side has not shied away from lofty rhetoric either: Beijing’s ambassador to Russia vowed the talks would carry “historic significance.”
A love triangle
At the summit itself, the spotlight fell on an unexpected trio of leaders. To the usual display of camaraderie between Xi and Putin was added Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who joined in with enthusiasm. Modi staged a photo op with the Russian and Chinese leaders, held a one-on-one meeting with Xi, and took a car ride with Putin — one reportedly marked by “important discussions.”
Historically, New Delhi’s relations with Beijing have been fraught, with periodic flare-ups such as the deadly border clashes in 2020–2021. Previous U.S. administrations leveraged this context to their advantage, viewing India as a potential counterweight to Chinese influence in the region. Although a thaw between the world’s two most populous countries had already begun in 2024, Trump may have accelerated the reconciliation between India and China significantly.
Trump has done all he could to ensure the rapprochement between China and India.
Kremlin.ru
In recent months, the U.S. president has done everything possible to further antagonize New Delhi, imposing massive tariffs on all Indian goods and calling its economy “dead.” As a result, his relationship with Modi has deteriorated to the point that the Indian PM now ignores calls from the White House. Predictably, this has nudged India closer to China, and Modi has welcomed Xi’s recent gestures. The two countries agreed to reopen certain trade routes and resume issuing visas. Xi told Indian leaders that their nations should perform the “dragon-elephant tango” together.
At the summit, both Modi and Xi made repeated — albeit indirect — references to Washington, denouncing tariffs, “bullying,” and a “Cold War mentality.” Modi’s visit to China thus came with promises of further improvement in relations — and with collective sidelong glances at the United States.
At the summit, Modi and Xi repeatedly made indirect references to Washington, condemning tariffs, “bullying,” and a “Cold War mentality”
Modi also flaunted his “special relationship” with Putin, and for now at least, New Delhi is increasing its purchases of Russian gas.
Talks in favor of peace
The question remains as to how deeply Xi discussed the war in Ukraine with his Russian counterpart — and what might come of it. After all, the meeting took place just two weeks after Putin’s brief summit with Trump in Alaska. Moscow certainly kept Beijing informed about those talks, which China closely monitored.
Rather than coming down openly on one side, Beijing has called on “all parties to agree on peace.” In late August — between Putin’s meetings with Trump and Xi —, media reports suggested that China was signaling its willingness to deploy peacekeepers in Ukraine after a peace agreement was ultimately signed. However, Beijing officially denied the rumors, and Kyiv had already rejected the proposal in advance.
Moreover, Chinese state media and diplomats frequently emphasize Beijing’s “objective and fair” stance in conflicts, carefully cultivating the image of a neutral arbiter. China continually seeks to uphold this illusion, publishing a semblance of a “peace plan” for Ukraine and making regular, if futile, calls for peace.
One of Beijing’s most carefully cultivated images is that of a neutral arbiter
At the summit itself, most participants largely stuck to familiar mantras. Putin, as usual, claimed that the West had “provoked” him into the ongoing war in Ukraine. He praised the “efforts” of China and India towards peace and demanded that the “root causes” of the war be addressed — in part, and Ukraine’s “unacceptable” NATO aspirations. Modi, for his part, limited himself to welcoming “all efforts to achieve peace,” while Xi called for expanding the influence of the SCO.
Unsurprisingly, no one — not even Xi — offered any practical solutions. As The Insider previously highlighted, China has more than enough levers that it could use to exert influence on Moscow if it were truly interested in peace. Chinese factories produce a significant share of the components that go into Russian drones, along with rocket fuel, precision instruments, and other goods critical for the Kremlin’s war effort. If they were to stop supplying even one of these categories, it could disable Russian weapon systems indefinitely and thereby bring the war closer to an end. Yet Beijing has never used any of these as leverage and instead continues to supply virtually everything Russia needs.
Moreover, since 2022, Beijing has quietly shouldered much of the burden of sanctions imposed on Moscow. China–Russia trade reached a record $245 billion in 2024 — twice the prewar level — as China bought Russian oil at discounted prices and exported cars, electronics, and consumer goods. In one way or another, Beijing continues to fuel Russia’s war machine, regardless of Xi’s “neutrality” claims.
Since 2022, Beijing has quietly shouldered much of Moscow's sanctions burden
Even U.S. threats are unlikely to dissuade China from buying cheap oil and other Russian raw materials. When Trump threatened additional tariffs on Chinese imports of Russian oil, Xi called the energy ties “just and legitimate” and stated that he would protect China's energy security “based on our own national interests.” Additionally, on August 29, China received its first shipment of liquefied gas from Russian firm Novatek's sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project.
China recently received its first shipment of liquefied gas from Russian Novatek's sanctioned project Arctic LNG 2
Still, China remains hesitant to seriously risk its own economic wellbeing for the sake of Russian irredentism. This year, trade has dipped by 8%, partly due to “farewell” sanctions from the Biden administration and Trump-era tariffs, which China has no plans to violate directly. Russia regularly calls on China to invest more actively in Russian projects, but Chinese investors have remained cautious, limiting their interest to initiatives with minimal sanctions risk and keeping investment volumes far below even pre-COVID levels.
In brief, China provides vital support to Russia's wartime economy and is by no means a neutral party in the conflict, but Beijing still stops well short of declaring itself a full-fledged Kremlin ally.
Paradoxically, serving as Moscow's lifeline suits Beijing both economically and from a security standpoint. In early summer, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi openly admitted to his European counterparts that a Russian defeat in the war is unacceptable for China. The prolonged fighting in Ukraine diverts U.S. resources and attention away from China and its areas of interest, leaving Beijing in a far more favorable position when it comes to issues like a potential invasion of Taiwan.
“Reverse Kissinger”
All of the above allowed Putin to feel quite comfortable on the sidelines of the SCO summit. Moreover, he could count on another previously unavailable benefit: potential Chinese concerns about a “reverse Kissinger” — a term used by U.S. and Chinese diplomats to describe a potential strategy of “luring” Russia away from China toward the West. In this hypothetical strategy, Ukraine would be reduced to a secondary role as the U.S. strengthens its foothold in the Asia-Pacific region — with Russia serving as a convenient buffer right on China’s border.
Should Xi attempt to interpret the Alaska summit as Trump’s move in this direction, he might try to convince Putin to “stay” — sweetening the deal with promises of investment, large trade volumes, and so on. At the summit in Tianjin, Putin certainly did not pass up the chance to highlight his special relationship with the U.S. president, boasting about the “understanding” he reached with Trump at the Alaska summit.
Admittedly, both American and Chinese analysts agree that the “reverse Kissinger” move is hardly feasible. First, the real Kissinger owed much of his success in China to the Soviet Union’s break with Beijing, a situation that has no equivalent today. Although present-day Russia is indeed diplomatically isolated — much as Cold War-era China was — Washington would be hard-pressed to offer Putin’s Kremlin anything that Xi’s China could not — especially without abandoning Ukraine entirely.
Although the U.S. leader remains reliably unpredictable, in recent weeks he has even sought to normalize relations with Xi. On Monday, in contrast to his May directive to “aggressively revoke” visas issued to Chinese students, Trump promised to admit 600,000 students from China to American universities — twice the number that had been in the country before his original directive. Shortly before that, the president boasted of securing Xi’s promise “not to invade Taiwan while he is in office” and assured skeptics that Washington and Beijing are “very close” to a new trade deal, which, if signed, could finally entice him to meet Xi.
Neither war nor peace
Nevertheless, a significant increase in Chinese cooperation with Russia remains as unlikely as a serious rapprochement between Beijing and New Delhi. In the wake of the SCO Summit, plenty of grand statements were voiced about “special relationships,” “global governance,” and the like — as is customary at summits chaired by Xi. Indeed, Xi launched yet another “Global Initiative” — this time on governance, to go along with previous editions on civilization, development, and security announced in recent years.
For the most part, these proposals boil down to sets of principles and ideas, with little emphasis on practical details. Overall, the SCO and its associated meetings offer very limited prospects for achieving concrete results, no matter which pillar they choose to lean on.
China, Russia, India, and the other invitees have vastly different priorities and strategic interests. Border tensions between China and India will not disappear, no matter how much Trump pushes New Delhi into its neighbor’s embrace. Moreover, New Delhi is in no rush to enter a full-scale trade war with Washington and is therefore keeping its Westward-facing door open for negotiations.
New Delhi is in no rush to enter a full-scale trade war with Washington and keeps the door open for negotiations
Here there is nothing new. All previous SCO meetings have produced little in the way of concrete outcomes, and at a Defense Ministers gathering in Qingdao this past June the group could not even issue a joint statement due to India’s insistence on condemning a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in Kashmir. Ultimately, it is unlikely that the recently wrapped-up summit — or any potential follow-up negotiations, let alone the parade — will produce any “global upheavals.” Quite simply, there are no objective grounds to expect such outcomes.